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Knowledge for INtegration Governance

The multilevel governance of immigrant integration in the European Union

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The KING project's objective is to elaborate a report on the **state of play** of migrant integration in Europe through an interdisciplinary approach and to provide decision- and policy-makers with **evidence-based recommendations** on the design of migrant integration-related policies and on the way they should be articulated between different policy-making levels of governance.

Migrant integration is a truly multi-faceted process. The contribution of the insights offered by different disciplines is thus essential in order better to grasp the various aspects of the presence of migrants in European societies. This is why **multidisciplinarity** is at the core of the KING research project, whose Advisory Board comprises experts of seven different disciplines:

EU Policy – Yves Pascouau

Political Science - Alberto Martinelli

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Social Science – Rinus Penninx

Applied Social Studies – Jenny Phillimore

Economics – Martin Kahanec & Alessandra Venturini

Demography – Gian Carlo Blangiardo

The project consists in the conduct of preliminary desk research to be followed by an empirical in-depth analysis of specific key topics identified within the desk research. To carry out these two tasks, each Advisory Board member chose and coordinated a **team** of three to four researchers, who have been assigned a range of topics to cover.

In the present Overview Paper Alberto Martinelli summarises and comments the desk research papers and the in-depth studies written by the researchers of the “Political Science” team he directed:

The project is coordinated by the **ISMU Foundation**.

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The multilevel governance of immigrant integration in the European Union

1. INTRODUCTION: POLICY, POLITY AND POLITICS?

Migrations are a constant aspect of human history, but the scope and features of the phenomenon change at different stages of development of the world economy and politics and vary in the different geographical regions. In contemporary globalization, migrations to Europe have accelerated in speed and scale and have become highly diverse in terms of immigrants' characteristics and patterns of spatial distribution. In the last twenty years, more than 26 million people have migrated to the EU (not including the new member states' migrants after 2004 and 2007) and the percentage of non communitarian citizens living in the EU is now close to 7% (quite unevenly distributed in the various member states). The trend is likely to continue in the next decades both because of push factors- such as high socio-economic inequalities between developed and developing countries that foster the number of job seekers and the many regional conflicts and authoritarian regimes that accrue the number of asylum seekers- and pull factors- such as the decline and aging of the indigenous population in most EU countries and the cultural refusal by many native workers to perform low-prestige jobs that foster the demand for workers willing to accept those jobs and to pay the related taxes and social insurance contributions.

The basic underlying principles of the EU- unity through diversity, respect for civil rights of all residents, commitment to guarantee the internal free movement of people, factors of production, goods and services - favour the influx of immigrants and the implementation of effective policies of social integration, both through EU-wide guidelines and coordinated rules among member states for regulating migration. However, the process is conflict-ridden; the larger the number of immigrants and the greater their concentration in certain territories, the stronger the demands for securitization, welfare chauvinism, xenophobic attitudes and inter-ethnic tensions. Given the forecasted increase in the percentage of immigrants in the next decades (that will accelerate as soon as the economic recession is over), the only effective alternative to the vicious circle between growing tensions and conflicts and harder securitization policies is a European-wide, harmonised set of multifaceted integration policies (labour market, education, health, housing, civil rights, active citizenship) at different territorial levels and involving a plurality of stakeholders.

The papers written for the KING project in a Political Science perspective are organized around the three meanings of the political dimension of social reality: policy, polity and politics.

The present paper, first, defines the key concept of governance and then analyses the EU as a political entity characterized by multilevel and multistakeholder governance and, more specifically, as a direct deliberative poliarchy. Second, it applies this model to the EU policy-making in the area of immigrant integration, that is defined as a multidimensional process of interactions between migrants and receiving society; not a single policy but a dimension which requires efforts in many areas and needs to be taken into account in a wide range of policy developments at various levels and involving numerous actors. It focuses on the open method of coordination and on the tension between mainstreaming and migrant-specific policies. Finally, it makes a few recommendations for the definition and implementation of effective integration policies. The paper is both analytical and normative; it provides the theoretical framing for, and develops a synthetic general analysis of, the issues discussed in the other three papers, which I briefly summarize here.

In the first desk research paper, Pasini and Coletti, define what is a smart policy of integration and on the basis of that evaluates a selected group of best practices at the national and local government levels. The degree of success (or effectiveness) of a given policy is related to the density of interaction among stakeholders, the complexity of the network, the centrality of end-users (i.e. the immigrants), the degree of innovativeness, as well as the activation of a set of social mechanisms (reciprocity, control, acceptance, certification of actors' claims by public authorities, material and non material rewards, and positive effect of past experience) that can trigger the two-way process between migrants and the receiving society. The question of policy transfer is also discussed and a smart integration policy design is outlined, stressing the need for a careful selection of actors who must be included and for a thorough analysis of the political culture and political institutions of the receiving country. In their following in-depth study, Pasini and Coletti discuss policy mainstreaming in the three integration areas of education, health and labour market of the regional government of Lombardy.

In the second desk research paper, Heidbreder, first, classifies the policy instruments' mix that the EU has developed in terms of their scope or degree of supranational power (primary law of the treaties and general policy guidelines, secondary binding law and soft steering) and of their type or content (security, basic rights); then, she examines the causal effects and integration dynamics of the multi-level migration policy-making and estimates which available adaptations in the EU policy toolbox might support certain policy developments rather than others. The main conclusion of the paper is that a bias exists toward security-related legislation and restrictive measures, the strong defense by member states of national regulation, the limited relevance of soft steering to promote rights-oriented policy measures; this bias is the effect of path dependency on the initial instrument choice, and will probably not change in future years). In her following in-depth study, Heidbreder stresses some selected particularities in the migration policy of the EU and its member states due to the EU's multilevel policy structure.

In the third desk research paper, Poletti and Regalia examine how and why attitudes of European citizens, parties and movements toward immigration and integration have changed through time, both at EU and member-states levels, and which are the main causes of anti-immigration attitudes (like the economic recession), on the assumption that the attitude of public opinion is crucial in accepting or rejecting this or that type of integration policy and, by reverse, that the level of integration of immigrants affects the attitudes toward them. Their study shows that immigration is perceived by citizens of EU countries more as a cultural than an economic problem, fostering the growth of anti-immigration parties and movements, which are often characterized by eurosceptical attitudes; they therefore suggest to implement long-term policies that address the cultural understanding of immigration by the native population, such as educational and anti-discrimination policies. In their following in-depth study, Poletti and Regalia analyze the results of the European Parliament elections of May 2014 and focus on the attitudes towards the EU and towards immigration of the winning parties, the second-placed and the third-placed ones, assessing the degree of consistency between the two types of attitudes in the 28 EU member countries.

2. GOVERNANCE RATHER THAN GOVERNMENT

The growing analytical and practical use of the concept of multilevel governance is partly due to the success of the more general concept of governance. Governance is more and more substituting government in the analysis of contemporary democracies. National governments are still the key actors in law-enacting and policy implementation, but they find increasingly difficult to mobilize all the resources needed by decision-making in complex societies. Private actors like interest groups, non governmental organizations, collective movements, as well as lateral government bodies such as independent administrative agencies, are increasingly involved at different territorial levels (supra-national, national, sub-national). Governance includes government, but goes beyond it. It can be defined as a method, a set of mechanisms and processes-both formal and informal- for dealing with a broad range of problems and conflicts through

which a group of actors arrives by negotiation and cooperation at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions aimed at managing and regulating a given domain of human activity. It includes the definition and implementation of rules as well as the establishment of formal and informal institutions and regimes for regulating collective activities and exercising power within a given territorial domain (Martinelli, 2012). Governance does not refer only to the principle of authority, but also to the principle of exchange and to the principle of cooperation. Authority has generally been considered as the constitutive principle of the state and of other public and private forms of government and bureaucratic organizations, exchange as the constitutive principle of the various types of market, cooperative solidarity as the constitutive principle of the various forms of community (whether traditional like families or clans, or new like collective movements). Governance implies the balanced interaction of these different types of institutions and collective actors and a new relationship between the public sphere and the private sphere (Martinelli, 2002,2008). Two other definitions of governance, that are complementary to mine, are worth mentioning. According to Stoker “governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from, but also beyond, government; identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues; identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action; is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors; and recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority” (1998,18-19). Stoker’s blurring of boundaries and responsibilities can be extended in order to imply the need for flexible policies that are not merely negotiated with non-state actors but can also encourage some of those actors to take on state responsibilities, e.g. in the sphere of integration policies. According to Willke, “governance is the activity of coordinating communications in order to achieve collective goals through collaboration” (2007,10), such as partnership between government and business, and between government and the non governmental organizations of various kinds; whereas government is centralized and top-down, it embodies the principle of authority and hierarchy, governance relies on cooperation and expert knowledge, is inclusive, problem-oriented and, multi-level.

A in The substitution of governance to government raises the basic question of democratic legitimacy: whereas government is considered more or less legitimate in terms of input democracy, i.e. the basic requirements of the democratic game (rule of law, the respect of citizens’ rights, the electoral competition for the right to govern), governance is more or less legitimate in terms of output democracy, i.e. the accountability of the decisions that are taken (Scharpf,1999, Giuliani,2008).

At the origin of the concept of governance is a new relationship between state and society, which can be traced, domestically, to the fiscal crisis of the state and the various processes of privatization and, internationally, to the competitive challenges that the nation states must face in the global market. National governments are considered both too big, invasive and costly for managing certain types of problems which change very much from one local context to another (such as delivering some types of public services), and too small to cope with the problems of the global agenda (such as those related to competition in the global market). As a consequence of this state of affairs, a transition is taking place from the command and control state to the enabling state (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989). It is therefore no surprise that we can witness several examples of the shift ‘from government to governance’, and that this shift applies particularly at those levels where the nation state appears less effective, i.e. the sub-national (city-region) level and the supranational (European Union) level.

The success of the concept of governance is also due to the new ideological climate in Western democracies. As Scott forcefully argues (2007), this success can be traced to the fact that at the level of politics, governance has something for everyone. It appeals to both the centre-right and the centre-left. The former can read: ‘less state/more market’ and more ‘limited government’; the latter can talk about ‘empowerment’ and the ‘enabling’ (rather than the welfare) state. Each can thus address their core constituencies while maintaining a high degree of consensus on specific policies. In this way, the more fundamental differences between left and right have been relativized and moderated and old dualisms between state and market have been set aside. Scott goes as far as to affirming that ‘governance’ is the new territory in which centre-left and centre-right play out their remaining differences.

Good governance cannot be but multilevel, in the sense that various agencies and networks with different competencies and capacities and overlapping jurisdictions regulate and integrate society at different levels (local, national, supranational), defining different sets of rights and obligations. Multilevel governance “evokes the idea of increasingly complex arrangements for arriving at authoritative decisions in increasingly dense networks of public and private, individual and collective, actors” (Piattoni, 2005). The key problem to be solved is to determine the more appropriate institutional level, at which the various functionally specific issues are addressed and coped with, and to build effective coalitions at ‘variable geometry’ that prove capable of winning the resistance of opponents.

Multilevelness is, however, only one of the general principles of good governance together with a few others: a) multi-dimensionality, insofar as multiple and relatively autonomous domains of human endeavour combine to produce a comprehensive and durable outcome; b) interdependency, insofar as actors actively interact who have different and even conflicting objectives, but who are sufficiently independent of each other, so that neither can impose a solution on the other, and yet sufficiently interdependent, so that both would lose if no solution were found; c) partnership and actor cooperation among several types of stakeholders, who interact through practices of voluntary agreement and respect for a plurality of values, thus producing a system of checks and balances; d) legitimate leadership in agenda setting, policy formation and implementation; e) accountability, as far as participants reciprocally legitimate each other and accept the principle of transparent decisions (that also requires both truly autonomous media and an empowered public opinion); f) innovativeness, in the sense that innovation and discovery are strongly encouraged (Schmitter, 2004).

Good governance is also based on a common and distinctive set of features: a) horizontal interaction among presumptive equal participants without distinction between their public or private status, b) regular, iterative exchanges among a fixed set of independent but interdependent actors, c) guaranteed (but possibly selective) access, preferably as early as possible in the decision-making cycle, d) organized participants that represent categories of actors, not individuals, e) capacity to take and to implement decisions binding on all participants and, at least potentially, binding on non-participants as well.

When these “standard” elements are in place, and when two crucial political choices have been made with regard to who has the right to participate and what their decision-making rules will be, arrangements for governance are supposed to contribute in three distinctive ways to improving the quality of decision-making: first, they enhance the opportunities for mutual accommodation through exchanges of reasoned arguments; second, they serve to generate higher levels of trust among those who participate; and, third, this in turn allows them to introduce a longer time-horizon into their calculations since sacrifices and losses in the present can be more reliably recuperated in future decisions.

3. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU

The European Union is a major example of multilevel governance. Being the product of treaties between states, the EU is necessarily the expression of partnership and the result of negotiated compromise. Multilevel governance rather than government, regulation rather than rule, and various kinds of informal coordination- such as peer reviews, benchmarking and policy learning-are characteristic connotations of the EU institutions and policies (Majone, 1996, Peters and Pierre, 2001, Martinelli, 2007).

The term governance enters in the EU literature in the late 80s and early ‘90s when, in the wave of the success of the European Single Act and the European Union Treaty, there is a growing amount of studies and policy analyses on EU institutions. The old debate between inter-governmentalists and neo-functionalists is revived. On the one hand, authors like Moravcsik (1991) and Milward (1992) stress the central role of the nation state in EU policy making. For Milward European integration has not meant the

end of the nation state, but on the contrary the major way of its survival in the face of growing global interdependence and costly national welfare systems Moravcsik, in his analysis of the negotiations leading to the approval of Single European Act, argues that the process of integration is the outcome of negotiations among the member states, which look at the EU through the lens of their own political preferences; the strongest states having a de facto veto power tend to lead the negotiation toward a common minimal denominator acceptable to all partners; member states will resist attempts to give away their sovereignty. Therefore, first, come national preferences, then intergovernmental negotiation takes place, together with the choice of a super-partes political entity that can guarantee the agreements. States are the key actors, which pool their sovereignty and delegate to the supra-national authority only what is strictly needed to enforce the agreements.

The alternative approach is well represented by Marks, who in a seminal essay(1993) outlines his model of multi-level governance. Analysing the planning and management of EU structural funds, he argues that the Single European Act has introduced significant changes: national governments can no longer monopolize the political representation of domestic interests and the choice of EU goals and means, EU institutions are highly independent in defining their preferences and strategies, decision-making power is diffused among many public and private actors at different levels of governance, decisional arenas are connected in networks that escape the control of national governments. In the emerging model of supranational governance, national, regional and local bodies interact in policy networks, member states are not the exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental negotiations, multiple actors interact at various levels of governance where competences overlap. Different public and private actors (regional and local governments, unions, interest groups) develop their pressure politics both at the national and EU levels, while are at the same time the targets of EU policies, exactly as member states are.

EU multilevel governance is criticised by sovereignists and theorists of democracy alike, who argue that decision-making at the EU level has a democratic deficit For the formers, EU institutions lack the legitimacy of those of the nation state; for the latters, in the EU representative democracy goes together with, and is often severely limited by, elitist and technocratic decisional mechanisms. It is true that in terms of input democracy, the EU is only a second grade representative democracy, since the European Council is made of ministers of the member-states' executives and the Commissioners are selected by national governments. But defenders of the EU system of governance argue that the European decision-making is legitimate in terms of output democracy, i.e. that decisions are taken more effectively and with less opposition than at the national level; but this greater effectiveness is not easily evaluated and measured. However, both the EU supra-national level and the sub-national level of regions and municipalities are promising fields for applying the governance model; both are constitutionally multi-level and have a built-in subsidiarity.

The EU multilevel governance is also a multistakeholder networks governance. The very nature of the EU favours the formation of policy networks for several reasons (Peterson, 2004): because rules and actors vary from one sector of policy to the other giving rise to a disaggregated polity; because various public and private actors participate 'horizontally' in decision making; because policy proposals are already formed – with the key role of experts as an autonomous actor- before they go to the EU institutional bodies (Council, Commission, Parliament) for the final phase of negotiation and approval. Forceful criticism has been expressed at this regard by Offe and Preuss, who define governance a style of ruling without an opposition, an instance of the depoliticization of contemporary democracies and consider the popularity of the concept in academia and beyond as symptomatic of the scarcity of power resources that are both legitimate and effective. 'Good' governance is ironically described as an activity that tries to create and maintain order in a complex world of highly interdependent elements with a blurred line between state and non-state, as well as national and supranational actors, and with multiple veto points and a severe scarcity of sovereign power resources; a world, "in which the activity of 'ruling' loses much of its vertical dimension of bindingness and 'giving orders', and it transforms itself into horizontal acts of winning support through partnership and a highly inclusive participation of all pluralist collective actors to the extent that they muster any capacities at all for vetoing or obstructing policy results or for contributing to desired outcomes" (2006:182). In a similar vein Crouch includes it in his notion of 'post-democracy' which favours

‘the maximum level of minimum participation’ and creates the conditions for an increasingly disembodied political elite to bypass democratic institutions and for government to become increasingly open to corporate pressures (2004). However this type of criticism does not recognize the innovative character of European governance, As Kohler-Koch (2000) remarks, the EU is a very complex polity that lacks the classical institutional mechanisms for composing diverse interests of democratic nation states and therefore relies on forms of network governance ‘at variable geometry’ with different coalitions for different problems. When networks have a stable membership and are cohesive -in the sense that each participant depends on the resources of others -and are relatively insulated from outside influence we can speak of policy communities. The EU Commission plays the key role in creating the adequate policy frame, selecting the interlocutors to include in the decision making arena with the aim of building the strategic winning coalition. This solution creates problems in the phase of implementation of the agreed EU policy at the national level, since the member states’ executives are no longer relatively free to compromise, but must be accountable to their national constituencies and have to respond to the pressures of interest groups that are at least partially different from those active at the EU level. And we can add that decision making involving a plurality of actors risk to fragment and obscure political responsibility. But when decisions resulting from policy networks at the EU level provide effective solutions to problems that cannot be dealt satisfactorily at the national level, problem- solving compensates for the lack of accountability at the supranational level.

Main examples of multilevel governance in European policy-making are the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and the Direct Deliberative Poliarchy (DDP). I maintain that they can successfully be applied to integration and other migration-related policies. OMC has been announced as a new instrument of governance at the Lisbon EU socio-economic summit in March 2000. Drawing on experience with the coordination of employment policies over the preceding decade, OMC has been broadly applied to a great range of policy fields as part of the Lisbon strategy ambitiously aimed at turning the EU into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and social cohesion by 2010. OMC can be generally defined as a process based on participation and transparency as general principles and on guidelines and timetables, indicators and benchmarking, regional and national targets and measures, periodic monitoring, evaluation, peer review and feedback as key steps (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005). OMC has been praised as a ‘third way’ for EU social policy between regulatory competition and harmonization, an alternative to both inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism and as a new way for enhancing democratic participation and accountability within the EU by opening up the policy-making process to inputs from NGOs, social partners and local/regional actors (Rodrigues, 2002). On the other hand, it has been criticized as an unnecessary “soft law” option even in domains where the EU already possesses legislative powers (Goetschy, 2003) and mostly as an exercise in symbolic politics where national governments repackage existing policies to demonstrate their apparent compliance with EU objectives (Radaelli, 2003). Although this kind of criticism has some ground, I think that OMC is a valuable approach to respond to the challenges of globalization (like the integration of immigrants) and to the need of enhancing EU competitiveness not only through ‘negative integration’(i.e. the abolition of obstacles against the free circulation of people, capital, goods and services), but also through ‘positive integration’(i.e. further cooperation and greater coordination among national and sub-national governments and key actors of the European civil society).

Direct Deliberative Poliarchy (Zeitlin and Sabel, 2007, Ferrera, 2008) is an attempt to develop the potentialities of the OMC and to take into account the main criticisms that have been addressed to this approach. It is based on a new notion of accountability and implies the direct participation of all actors involved. It is a selected and negotiated poliarchy in which argued discussions aim at disentrenching consolidated social practices and interest coalitions. It grows on the experience of the EU, that since the 1987 Single European Act has developed a new architecture (public rule making), in which EU institutions and member-states jointly define the main goals and at the same time agree on procedures and indicators for the empirical evaluation of goals attainment. Several public and private actors can contribute to attaining the agreed goals at different levels of authority and involvement. Each participant enjoys a high degree of autonomy in the choice of strategies and means, but has the obligation to report periodically and

systematically according to the commonly agreed procedures and indicators and to participate in peer reviews. Objectives, procedures and measurement criteria can be periodically reviewed. This in its turn requires appropriate indicators. The term 'poliarchy' is justified by the fact that participants are accountable not in the classical sense of respecting the mandate, but in the sense of being obliged to give account and justify their own autonomous choices in front of their peers in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and equity. It is accountability without sovereignty since there is no threat of sanctions by a hierarchical authority that can assure predicted reactions. But why then should actors comply and predicted reactions take place anyway? Because of the shadow of authority (actors know that, if they do not comply, policy making goes back to the traditional form with the consequent risk of higher inefficiency and iniquity. Direct deliberative poliarchy in an instance of bargaining when hierarchy becomes a shadow (the metaphor of the 'wip in the window').

4. A MULTILEVEL AND MULTISTAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN THE EU

As specified by the European Commission (SEC, 2011, 957 Final), integration is "a multidimensional process of interactions between migrants and receiving society. It is not a single policy but a dimension which requires efforts in many areas and needs to be taken into account in a wide range of policy developments at various levels and involving numerous actors". Thus, the integration process refers to several policy areas (employment, education, health, social and cultural ties) and has to be adapted to specific "target group of migrants with particular needs, such as young migrants, migrant women, the elderly and refugees". It has to be also reported the concept of "two - way process of mutual accommodation requiring both the strong commitment on the side of the receiving society and the active participation of migrants".

Integration is clearly defined and can be further specified adopting Penninx's analytical definition: the process of becoming an accepted part of society, a process that is articulated in three basic dimensions and types of issues, the legal-political (that refers to legal inclusion through residence permits or naturalisation and political rights and statuses), the socio-economic (that pertains to access to and actual use of institutional facilities for work, housing, health and education) and the ethnic-cultural (that concerns the domain of ethnic, cultural, religious perceptions and practices of immigrants and the receiving society and their reciprocal reactions to diversity).

These definitions raise the key questions of who decides and implement what in integration policy, how competencies and responsibilities are distributed at different levels of governance, who are the major stakeholders and beneficiaries, the key actors of change and innovation, the main supporters and opponents of various types of integration policy, what are the most frequent forms of cooperation and conflict among EU member states, between them and the local authorities and private actors, and between them and EU institutions. I will discuss some of these questions focusing on multilevel, multistakeholder governance, since the integration of immigrants is achieved through a mix of general institutional migration-related policies and specific integration policies that are decided and implemented at different territorial levels: the national government level, the local level of municipalities and regional governments (in federal and decentralized states), and, more recently, the supranational EU level.

Policy making at different levels of authority and policy implementation by public and private administrative agencies at different territorial levels are related to the basic dimensions sketched above. The main competence and responsibility for the legal and political dimension of integration lie both at the national and EU level; local authorities can be involved in helping implementation through processes of administrative decentralization (e.g. providing information and counseling on legal inclusion, favouring political participation in local assemblies, etc.). Most of the policies concerning the socio-economic dimension are decided at the national level, but regional governments and municipalities are often

involved in policy implementation according to different welfare state models (e.g., in the Italian national health system, the central government only provides financing, but services are managed at the regional level) and less often in policy definition (in several countries programs of social housing are decided at the local level, in others educational institutions and labour market services are highly decentralized). Policies pertaining to the ethnic cultural dimension involve all levels; EU institutions and national governments increasingly see cultural integration as a condition for inclusion, but involve local administrations in policy implementation (e.g. in organizing language and 'citizenship' courses). This *prima facie* division of labour among different levels of governance and with different types and degree of involvement of private actors) must be specified taking into account the different political-institutional architectures and the different economic, social and cultural contexts. As I will suggest in the recommendations at the end of the paper, the distribution of the various integration policies should take into account the comparative analysis of best practices and the problem of policy transfer.

The multilevel governance of immigrant integration has also been the result of the historical process of immigration in Europe and the evolution of related migration policies. In the second half of the XX century, Europe has become a continent of immigration, but European countries are not nations of immigrants in the sense of the US, Canada or Australia and do not perceive themselves like that. A first wave of immigrants came to Northwestern Europe and concerned refugees after the Second World War, people from former colonies, and workers from less developed European states. In the 1980s a second wave of immigrants reached other European countries, that had been until then labour-exporting, like Italy and Spain. After the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, a third wave of immigration took place in the new EU member states, which experienced at the same time emigration and transit migration.

The governance of such a process started with regulating policies at the national level, which were followed -sometimes with significant delays- by integration policies. Local policies have been mostly integration policies and have been developed either as a reaction to the lack, or the sheer absence, of such policies at the national level, or as a complement to them. Except for a few advanced countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, where as early as the 1980s national governments encouraged integration policies at the local level, municipalities usually substituted for the lack of action of national executives and often conflicted with them. The role of cities in integration policy was enhanced by the exchange of knowledge and experience in networks of cities, like Cities for Local Integration Policies, Integrating Cities, Intercultural Cities, the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, with strong connections with the European Commission after 2003 (Penninx 2014). The last comer has been governance at the EU level, with the same pattern of integration measures following regulation and other immigration policies. The sequence of treaties that gave birth first to the European communities and then to the European Union (1993) have created a EU citizenship, guaranteed a complete freedom of movement and removed physical, technical and fiscal barriers (*Single European Act*, 1992). But the opening of internal borders implied the preservation of their common external border and the coordination of member states policies concerning the admission of third-country nationals. Also as a consequence of the rapid growth of asylum-seekers in the early 1990s, the governance of immigration at the EU level has been predominantly concerned with increasingly restrictive admission rules and securization policies aiming at fighting illegal immigration.

The 2009 Lisbon treaty clearly states that competence for policy-making concerning integration rests with national governments of member states and not with the EU, and actually member states strongly defend their sovereignty in general integration-related policies, such as education health, social security and housing. Employment policies are a partial exception.. But, in recent years "national governments have committed themselves to increase the EU competences and work programmes on the integration of legally-resident third-country nationals" (*Handbook on Integration*, 3rd edit. 2009, p.15). And actually a small group of EU directives have been approved which aim at improving the position of third-country immigrants, such as the directive on the immigrants's right to family reunification and on their free movement between member states after five years as legal residents. And also in the Lisbon Treaty we find a wide variety of soft law mechanisms in policy making and implementation can be developed (the Open Method of Coordination and the Direct Deliberative Polyarchy that I illustrated earlier apply here, as well as

other ways of coordination like the definition of common guidelines) and financial support of integration policies. For instance, the 2005 Prague Programme defined eleven criteria as foundations of member states' integration policies, which affirm that integration is a bilateral process requiring the respect of basic EU values (rule of law, individual freedom, non discrimination, ecc.), equal access to institutions and services, opportunities for work, learning, cultural exchange and integration, active citizenship. Support was provided by the 2007 European Fund for the integration of immigrants (EIF) for a total amount of EUR: 825 million in five years especially to compensate states for their efforts in the reception and integration of refugees. Coordination of member states's policies was decided by the Stockholm Programme adopted in 2009 by the European Council (Carrera and Guild,2012), through the creation of an ad hoc network of contact points, the definition of an index of policy effectiveness (in terms of employment, education, social inclusion and citizenship) and the support of integration-aimed activities like language and professional training courses and active involvement in community life (further specified in the Saragoza EU Council of ministers the following year).

The national level remains central in the governance process: national parliaments pass legislation and executives define and implement general, universalistic,top-down policies that help coping with many of the problems which must be solved in order to achieve successful integration; national governments are implementing policies so diverse as labour laws to avoid illegal employment and discrimination on the job, legal minimum wage, the recognition of full citizenship to settled residents, the introduction of *jus soli* for the first-generation's descendants, the removal of legal barriers to immigrants' civic participation, the definition of uniform standards for assessing prior learning and orientation programmes for newcomer pupils, intercultural education in the curriculum, early work experience through quality-assured apprenticeships and work-learning programmes.The European Website on Integration (EWSI) provide many examples of best policies and practices at the national level.

However, notwithstanding all what is done by national governments, both the supranational and the local levels should become more and more active, the former in order to uphold the civil rights of migrants in the light of the EU core values, the latter since it is closer to the end-users and can be better tailored to their specific needs (as the assessment of best policies at local level in key social integration domains show, Mipex Database, 2013). Moreover, non governmental organisations are also relevant, either as partner with, or substitute for, governmental actors (for instance, Penninx and Roosblad, 2000, have shown that, in the absence of a governmental integration policy in Germany until 2000, NGOs, particularly trade unions and churches,have been crucial in integrating guest workers and their families), and as implementing agencies in partnered multilevel governance programmes,like those of the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, aiming at promoting social inclusion and cohesion with substantial financial means (which are used by regional and local authorities, often in cooperation with civil society non governmental actors). This DG is not the only relevant for integration policy; there is also the DG Freedom, Security and Justice, that is responsible for early reception and integration of recent newcomers, not only refugees and accepted asylum-seekers, but also third- country nationals until they have become long-term residents. The approach of this latter DG is however quite different, it appears mostly concerned with the ethnic-cultural dimension, focusing on mandatory integration courses and subsequent testing for those newcomers who wish to settle (with sanctions like administrative fines and the withholding of residence rights).

Authors like Boswell and Geddes (2011) argue that the nature of EU migration policy does not fit with the usual multilevel model, mostly because, differently from redistributive types of policy like cohesion and regional development that reallocate resources, migration is a regulatory policy governing access to those resources (although they concede that migration policy cannot ignore multilevel politics since it is fundamentally associated with issues around territory, territoriality and borders). Heidbreder effectively counterargues that also in regulatory policies one can find multilevel-specific characteristics, first of all the initial issue-related choice that constrains the allocation of powers and the policy trajectory across the different levels of governance. The initial choice in the EU framework has actually more far-reaching consequences than in a classic democratic state setting. If initially framed as security issue, the migration

policy is embedded in this particular area of EU competence with specific decision-making modes and actors. If conferred as a competence to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), are the national ministers of interior who decide upon all relevant issues; thus the emphasis on exclusion, restriction and securitization at the EU level directly reflects the preferences of the ministries that control the process and their ability to dominate the institutional space (Schain, 2009). Heidbreder further argues that merely adding more soft-steering, voluntary or supportive competences to promote the harmonisation of standards and the strengthening of individual migrants' rights will not change the trajectory the present choice implies, with the consequence of creating a path-dependencies that become ever harder to break. And concludes that the most likely future development is hence that the security bias of EU migration policy will not be diminished and that this may threaten to undermine other attempts for more encompassing rights-based harmonisation; revising certain aspects of the Stockholm programme may adapt details of the strongly security-oriented course of EU migration policy, but it is very unlikely to change its general trajectory.

I consider this view of the EU policy-making on immigration and integration too narrow and pessimistic. EU migration policy is not only regulatory, but also distributive and redistributive; nor does it need to be framed only, or even mostly, as an issue of securitization and exclusion. As I suggested earlier in discussing the EU multilevel governance, exploiting the opportunities stemming from the application of the OMC and DDP-on the basis of the rich repertoire of best available policies at both the national and local levels (selected according to the criteria suggested by Pasini and Coletti) can set in motion processes that could eventually lead to a more comprehensive EU integration policy and even to an harmonisation of national and local approaches which could go beyond restrictive measures and minimum individual rights. And, as I will argue in the next section, the EU migration policy is by no means confined to immigration-specific norms and measures and to a single issue, but it can be pursued within policies addressed at the entire population.

5. MAINSTREAMING

It would be a mistake to restrict the evaluation of the EU performance in this field to migration-specific policies, since much can be achieved in integration through mainstreaming, i.e. the practice of reorienting policies at the entire population, including vulnerable groups, such as immigrants, without targeting them specifically. Mainstreaming has among other things the advantage of arousing less political opposition by anti-immigration parties and movements which, as the recent EU parliament elections have shown, are getting a growing support. As the Upstream project shows (Collett and Petrovic; Scholten, 2014), policies tailored to the needs of specific groups, such as young immigrants, still exist alongside those that target all those who have an economic necessity, like all jobless young people. This is certainly the case of Germany (Bendel,2014;Kindermann,2014), where specific policies for the integration of immigrants coexist with measures to meet the needs of young people in general, which are developed at the Lander and municipal levels, and focus on education, professional orientation, career counseling, preventions of dropping out of school, participation of parents in the school system. The situation in France is different (Escafré-Dublet,2014; here, the general distrust of policies that target a particular group over others originates in the republican principle of equal treatment for all regardless of origin, religion or ethnicity. And the fact that integration initiatives implemented by the *Direction de l'accueil, de l'integration et de la citoyennete* (Interior Ministry) are limited to an immigrant's first five years of staying in the country implies mainstreaming after that initial period. The *Reception and Integration Contract* is a special instance of this limited-time, targeted integration. However, as the Upstream study argues, sometimes the choice of mainstreaming can be due to lack of funds for specifically targeted programs rather than to a conscious choice ("it is difficult to assess whether this state of affairs is due to budgetary constraints or a desire to spread the responsibility for integration across government departments").

In Pasini's and Coletti's Lombardy case-study, the largest trade unions (Cgil, Cisl) through their special services for work issues (*Sportello vertenze*) do deal with specific migrant workers problems. Mainstreaming is coherent with a culture of equal rights and avoid the risk of creating ghettos of social exclusion and labour market segmentation and ethnicization, but it runs the risk that the migrants are not central in the networks which are necessary to develop effective policies. The three areas examined in this case study present a differentiated picture: in health care mainstreaming clearly prevails; the national health system managed by the regional governments takes care of all citizens and regular immigrants and provides emergency care for irregular people in need too, whereas non governmental organizations implement actor-specific measures, in constant dialogue with local and regional institutions. Mainstreaming prevails (although to a more limited extent) also in educational policies, implemented by the national and regional governments and targeted to the whole population; however, there are also specific measures targeted to immigrant children, sometimes with the help of welfare supporters and mediators, on the assumption that in order to avoid the risk of segregation the most appropriate approach is to provide extra-curricula hours for all those who have learning and cognitive problems rather than forming separate classes. Policy mainstreaming prevails also in the labour market, that is a rather autonomous space for matching demand and supply of labour, with weak government influence. On the one hand, immigrants are well integrated in the Lombardy labour market, on the other, the market is segmented and mostly irregular workers are not protected from exploitation by their employers (sometimes immigrants too); in order to protect the weakest workers and, in general, to counter brain wasting and to enhance equality of opportunities, specific targeted actions- such as legal assistance, language courses, upgrading of professional skills- is also necessary by trade unions and other non governmental organizations. The general picture that emerges is one of public institutions mostly adopting mainstreaming policies, with actor-specific supporting activities left to third-sector NGOs, like trade unions, religious organizations, private foundations, service-providing associations, active citizenship groups and the like. Since in this situation there is the risk that integration as a specific concern and commitment disappears within general mainstreaming policies, specific attention should be paid that general responses to all those sharing specific needs does not obscure the specific vulnerabilities of particular groups.

In mainstreaming the most relevant problem is the horizontal coordination of different departments cross-cutting on integration policies for immigrants- education, labour, economics, housing, urban development. While scholars tend to highlight the overall complexity of a phenomenon like the integration of immigrants, policy makers often opt for simpler responses through assigning responsibility for coping with a problem to a specific department/office, that fails to grasp the complexity of the issue. Mainstreaming is useful insofar as it implies that different competences cooperate in dealing with a problem and that the policy-making process encompasses all the relevant dimensions. But the problem of horizontal coordination- that is already enough complex in itself- is intertwined with that of vertical coordination among different levels of decision making and implementation (supranational, national, regional, municipal), thus creating a highly complex system of governance that is not easy to manage.

6. CONCLUSION: A FEW RECOMMENDATIONS

First, immigrant integration policy in the EU should be multilevel and multistakeholder. EU primary law and secondary binding legislation should guarantee a single European space for all legally resident aliens with common rights and obligations and freedom of movements, while soft steering should foster the coordination and mutual learning of a vast array of integration best practices implemented at the national and subnational levels. The Commission plays a key role as a kind of 'entrepreneur of ideas' that for each integration policy proposal adopts a form of network governance 'at variable geometry' with different coalitions for different problems, creating the adequate policy frame and selecting the interlocutors to include in the decision-making arena, thus building a strategic winning coalition. For every integration policy it is necessary to determine the more appropriate institutional level, at which the various

functionally specific issues are addressed and coped with, and to build effective coalitions that prove capable of winning the resistance of opponents. In all areas in which there is no secondary binding law for member states, the latter should cooperate with EU institutions (first of all, the Commission) in the form of a direct deliberative polyarchy. The EU and the national governments jointly define the main goals (such as increased participation of immigrants in the labour market, better access to health, housing and educational services, reduction of discriminatory measures and xenophobic attitudes in the receiving society) and at the same time agree on procedures and indicators for the empirical evaluation of goals attainment. Many policy networks or communities can contribute to achieving the agreed objectives: national ministries, independent authorities and other regulatory councils and agencies, regional and local governments, interests groups and associations (like trade unions, employers' and consumers' associations), business firms, mass media, collective and ad hoc movements, research centers, think tanks, networks of various kind. Each policy network (and each participant within the network) enjoys a high degree of autonomy in the choice of strategies and means, but has the obligation to report periodically and systematically according to the commonly agreed procedures and indicators and to participate in peer reviews. Objectives, procedures and measurement criteria can be periodically reviewed too, because of the entrance of new actors that are considered necessary to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and equity. This in its turn requires appropriate indicators of effectiveness concerning precisely defined targets; in the case of integration policy macro-indexes (like the -Migration Integration Policy Index , that includes seven different types of integration policy: labour market, mobility, family reunion for third country nationals, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discriminatory policies), as well as micro individual indexes (like Blangiardo's and Cesareo's Integration index). A similar form of direct deliberative polyarchy should apply to regions and municipalities, The importance of subnational governments is growing and does not need to be argued further, as it is demonstrated both by Pasini and Coletti selection of best integration policies and by the other research groups, in particular those coordinated by Penninx and Phillimore.

The multistakeholder character of immigrants' integration policy in the EU-that I have already described in the direct deliberative polyarchy model- means that besides immigrant associations and groups, other key non-governmental actors must be thoroughly involved in order to form winning coalitions for effective policy definition and implementation (unions, employers organizations, political parties and movements,etc).. Effective policy definition and implementation by broad coalitions is the best way to respond to the present rise in several EU member countries of nationalist-populist parties with xenophobic attitudes (Martinelli, 2013), which feed a vicious circle of more obstacles to integration, more cultural and ethnic tensions, more demands for securisation policies. Integration policies should not only involve all relevant actors, but be developed with a genuine bottom-up approach, since integration is a process that starts on the ground. Moreover, a multistakeholder approach requires that all actors are properly educated and informed. If immigration, as Poletti and Regalia suggest, is perceived by citizens of EU countries more as a cultural than an economic problem, it seems reasonable to suggest that European countries should try to focus more on long-term measures that address the cultural understanding of immigration by the native population, such as educational and anti-discrimination policies. Education can be the keystone in the integration process, teachers should be equipped with skills for managing diversity, teachers with migrant backgrounds should be recruited, and immigrants should be provided with the necessary educational skills to integrate in the receiving society

Second, an appropriate balance between mainstreaming and migrant-specific policies should be reached. On the one hand, smart integration policies should be actor-centered, i.e. tailored to specific immigrant needs and involving the strategies of migrants both as individuals and as members of an ethnic groups (as highlighted by the notion of double embeddedness in the study of ethnic entrepreneurship, Martinelli,2004). Immigrants represent a weak social category and the integration process should be characterized by a two-way process between receiving society and migrants themselves. Various social mechanisms such as reciprocity, control, acceptance, actor certification, reward, endowment, can help to positively activate this process, change the behaviour of actors and make for successful integration policies. On the other hand, an actor-centered approach does not imply that integration policies should be

immigrant-specific. Mainstreaming, i.e. the practice of reorienting policies at the entire population, including vulnerable groups, such as immigrants, without targeting them specifically, is a major way to foster integration, provided it is a conscious choice and not the result of a lack of funds for specifically targeted programs or a desire to avoid responsibility. As the Upstream study shows as well as the Lombardy case study, mainstreaming tends to prevail in governmental integration policies, although at different degrees in the various geopolitical contexts and policy areas, and to coexist with a wide array of immigrant-specific supporting activities made by NGOs such as trade unions, religious organizations, private foundations, services-providing associations, and the like. Mainstreaming is coherent with a culture of equal rights and avoid the risk of creating ghettos of social exclusion and labour market segmentation and ethnicization, but it has to face the double problem of horizontal coordination of different departments (education, labour, economics, housing, urban development) cross-cutting on integration policies for immigrants), and of vertical coordination among different levels of decision-making and implementation (supranational, national, regional, municipal), thus creating a highly complex system of governance that is difficult to manage.

Finally, integration policies should be innovative and aimed at specific and rigorously defined objectives according to the various phases of the 'smart policy process'(Pasini and Coletti): the preparatory phase that identifies the specific integration problem and examines the peculiarities of the target case trying to categorize the actors involved in the policy; the selection phase, that selects the sample of practices that seem to work better according to precise criteria and collect evidence of 'what works' in the source case; the analytical phase that reconstructs the policy process of the source case in such a way to safeguard the policy designer against the risks involved in a mindless implementation and replication of a policy; the comparative phase that analyzes the similarities between the source case and the target case in order to check whether there are the necessary conditions to transfer the innovation; the actual design phase with must pay special attention to objectives and purposes, actions and activities, length of application, density and complexity of the network of actors involved, evaluation of results and engagement of stakeholders and target groups; and finally the assessment phase, which evaluates the potential for replication in different contexts and for different target groups (through the European Website on Integration and other similar instruments), in order to transfer key innovative elements rather than full-fledged policies. Particularly relevant are the constant monitoring and evaluation of the role played in policy implementation by both public institutions (general and immigrant-specific, more or less inclusive) and private voluntary institutions of and for immigrant groups (religious, leisure, trade unions).

Finally, attention should be paid to the main and more frequent types of conflict that may arise in the implementation of a given policy, as well as to the participants' perception of who benefits and who loses. In this respect, a repertoire of worst policies/practices and of policy failures could be constructed, in order to apply a trial and error method.

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